Old and Young Politicians

54 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2015 Last revised: 18 Apr 2018

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Traviss Cassidy

University of Alabama

Ugo Troiano

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 7, 2018

Abstract

We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage more often in political budget cycles than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations.

Keywords: politicians, age, political budget cycles

JEL Classification: D78, H72, H77, J18

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Cassidy, Traviss and Troiano, Ugo, Old and Young Politicians (April 7, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2564729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2564729

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Traviss Cassidy

University of Alabama ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Ugo Troiano (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )

611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/troiano

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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