Efficient Investment via Assortative Matching

28 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2015

See all articles by Olga Rud

Olga Rud

Hamilton College - Economics Department

Jean Paul Rabanal

Monash University

Date Written: January 15, 2015

Abstract

This paper compares pre-commitment investment strategy in a linear public goods game using two different matching protocols: assortative and random matching. We express the payoff function as an investment decision in which players pre-commit to an investment level and then a third party (the experimenter) matches subjects into pairs after having observed the investment decisions. After ruling out a mixed NE, we adopt the asymmetric equilibrium suggested by Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2010) and we (surprisingly) find that subject behavior is in line with the predictions. The mean investment level under the assortative matching treatment is remarkably high and is close to 90 percent of the initial endowment, when compared to the random matching treatment (50 percent of the initial endowment).

Keywords: Public goods, Assortative Matching, Cooperation

JEL Classification: C71, C78, C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Rud, Olga and Rabanal, Jean Paul, Efficient Investment via Assortative Matching (January 15, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2565196 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565196

Olga Rud

Hamilton College - Economics Department ( email )

198 College Hill Road
Clinton, NY 13323
United States

Jean Paul Rabanal (Contact Author)

Monash University ( email )

Melbourne
Australia

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