Optimal Security Design Under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation

36 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2015

See all articles by Kostas Koufopoulos

Kostas Koufopoulos

University of Warwick - Finance Group

Roman Kozhan

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School

Giulio Trigilia

University of Rochester - Simon Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2014

Abstract

We consider a model of external financing in which entrepreneurs are privately informed about the quality of their projects and seek funds from competitive financiers. The literature restricts attention to monotonic or ‘manipulation proof’ securities and finds that straight debt is the unique optimal contract. We characterize the optimal contract when entrepreneurs can misreport their earnings by some amount. Straight debt is often suboptimal and never uniquely optimal. The optimal contract is non-monotonic and involves profit manipulation in equilibrium. It can be implemented either including performance-based bonuses, or via milestone payments, (as in venture capital).

Keywords: security design, financial innovation, capital structure, asymmetric information, venture capital

JEL Classification: D82; D86; G32; M40

Suggested Citation

Koufopoulos, Kostas and Kozhan, Roman and Trigilia, Giulio, Optimal Security Design Under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation (July 1, 2014). WBS Finance Group Research Paper No. 230, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2565739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565739

Kostas Koufopoulos

University of Warwick - Finance Group ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd
Coventry, CV4 7AL
Great Britain

Roman Kozhan (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Giulio Trigilia

University of Rochester - Simon Business School ( email )

Rochester, NY 14627
United States

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