Leniency and Damages

37 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2015 Last revised: 10 Oct 2016

See all articles by Paolo Buccirossi

Paolo Buccirossi

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)

Catarina Moura Pinto Marvão

Economics Department, University College Dublin; Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 29, 2015

Abstract

Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated in a EU directive, adopted in November 2014, which seeks a balance between public and private enforcement. It protects the effectiveness of a Leniency Program by preventing the use of leniency statements in subsequent actions for damages and by limiting the liability of the immunity recipient to its direct and indirect purchasers. Our analysis shows such compromise is not required: limiting the cartel victims’ ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of a Leniency Program and may be counter-productive. We show that damage actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized (as in Hungary) and full access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, including leniency statements, is granted to claimants (as in the US).

Keywords: Private and public enforcement, cartels, competition policy, Leniency Program

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D43, D81, H11, K21, K42, L13, L44, L51

Suggested Citation

Buccirossi, Paolo and Marvão, Catarina Moura Pinto and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Leniency and Damages (November 29, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566774 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2566774

Paolo Buccirossi

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR) ( email )

Via di Monserrato 48
Rome, 00186
Italy
+39 066 830 0530 (Phone)

Catarina Moura Pinto Marvão (Contact Author)

Economics Department, University College Dublin ( email )

Belfield, Dublin 4 4
Ireland

Stockholm School of Economics - Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm, 11383
Sweden

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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