Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability

27 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2015 Last revised: 1 Sep 2015

See all articles by Attila Ambrus

Attila Ambrus

Duke University - Department of Economics

Ben Greiner

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Date Written: August 26, 2015

Abstract

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member’s contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. We also find that participating in a democratic punishment procedure makes even non-contributors’ punishment intentions more pro-social.

Keywords: public good contribution experiments, punishment, voting

JEL Classification: C72, C92, H41

Suggested Citation

Ambrus, Attila and Greiner, Ben, Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability (August 26, 2015). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 183. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2567326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2567326

Attila Ambrus (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Ben Greiner

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
80
Abstract Views
660
rank
320,553
PlumX Metrics