Shareholder Engagement and Identification

9 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2015

See all articles by Peter Böckli

Peter Böckli

Böckli Bodmer & Partners

Paul L. Davies

University of Oxford- Faculty of Law

Eilis Ferran

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Guido Ferrarini

University of Genoa - Law Department and Centre for Law and Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

José M. Garrido Garcia

International Monetary Fund (IMF); University of Castilla-La Mancha (Spain)

Klaus J. Hopt

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alain Pietrancosta

Sorbonne Law School

Markus Roth

University of Marburg - Faculty of Law

Rolf Skog

Göteborg University - Department of Law

Stanislaw Soltysinski

Komisja Kodyfikacyjna Prawa Cywilnego; Sołtysiński Kawecki & Szlęzak, Legal Advisors

Jaap W. Winter

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Insead

Eddy Wymeersch

Ghent University - Financial Law Institute; ECGI

Date Written: February 23, 2015

Abstract

The European Commission launched, in April 2014, a new initiative to amend the shareholder rights directive as regards to the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement. Under this heading, the Commission proposal intends to grant rights to shareholders concerning director remuneration (say on pay) and related party transactions. Moreover, it also imposes duties concerning an engagement policy on institutional investors and asset managers and gives rights to the management concerning shareholder identification.

This paper deals with shareholder engagement and identification by referring to the initial Commission proposal. Both instruments are motivated by referring to the support shareholders have allegedly given to managers’ excessive risk taking before the financial crisis. The current level of “monitoring” of investee companies and engagement by institutional investors and asset managers is considered inadequate, leading to suboptimal governance of listed companies (see preamble 2). It is questionable whether the financial crisis revealed weak governance in listed companies and whether the rules proposed are likely to meet the objectives as stated in the directive.

Suggested Citation

Böckli, Peter and Davies, Paul L. and Ferran, Eilis and Ferrarini, Guido and Garrido Garcia, José M. and Hopt, Klaus J. and Pietrancosta, Alain and Roth, Markus and Skog, Rolf R. and Soltysinski, Stanislaw and Winter, Jaap W. and Wymeersch, Eddy O., Shareholder Engagement and Identification (February 23, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2568741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2568741

Peter Böckli

Böckli Bodmer & Partners ( email )

St. Jakobs-Strasse 41
PO Box 2348
Basel, 4002
Switzerland

Paul L. Davies

University of Oxford- Faculty of Law ( email )

Harris Manchester College
Oxford, OX1 3TD
United Kingdom

Eilis Ferran

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom
+ 44 1223 338335 (Phone)
+ 44 1223 338340 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Guido Ferrarini

University of Genoa - Law Department and Centre for Law and Finance ( email )

Via Balbi, 22
16126 Genova, 16100
Italy
+39 010 209 9894 (Phone)
+39 010 209 9890 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.clfge.org

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

José M. Garrido Garcia

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

University of Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) ( email )

Toledo 45071
Spain

Klaus J. Hopt

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
D-20148 Hamburg
Germany
+49 40 41 90 02 05 (Phone)
+49 40 41 90 03 02 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Alain Pietrancosta

Sorbonne Law School ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

Markus Roth (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - Faculty of Law ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 6
Marburg, D-35037
Germany

Rolf R. Skog

Göteborg University - Department of Law ( email )

Viktoriagatan 30
Box 650
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden
+46 31 7866990 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: www.law.gu.se

Stanislaw Soltysinski

Komisja Kodyfikacyjna Prawa Cywilnego ( email )

Ujazdowskie Ave. No. 11
Warsaw, 00-950
Poland

Sołtysiński Kawecki & Szlęzak, Legal Advisors ( email )

Wawelska Str. No. 15B
Warsaw, 02-034
Poland

Jaap W. Winter

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31653978419 (Phone)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Oude Manhuispoort
Amsterdam
Netherlands

Insead ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Eddy O. Wymeersch

Ghent University - Financial Law Institute ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, B-9000
Belgium
+32 9 264 68 27 (Phone)
+32 9 264 68 55 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ugent.be/fli

ECGI ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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