Hawks and Doves at the FOMC

26 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2015

See all articles by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ronald Mahieu

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research, Econometrics and Finance Group; TiasNimbas Business School

Louis Raes

Tilburg University; Tilburg University - European Banking Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2015

Abstract

In this paper we estimate ideal points of Bank Presidents and Board Governors at the FOMC. We use stated preferences from FOMC transcipts and estimate a hierarchical spatial voting model. We find a clear difference between the average Board Governor and Bank President. We find little evidence for difference in ideal points according to the appointing president in case of Bank Governors. Similarly career background has no clear effect on the ideal points. We find that the median ideal point at the FOMC has been fairly stable over our sample period (1989-2007) emphasizing the lack of a political appointment channel. We also show that there was considerable variation in the median ideal point of Bank Presidents and Board Governors, but that these seem to cancel each other out. Also the dispersion of opinions (the spread between the lowest and highest ideal point) varies over time, suggestion variation in agreement at the FOMC.

Keywords: central banks, committees, FOMC, ideal points, transcripts

JEL Classification: C11, E58, E59

Suggested Citation

Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. and Mahieu, Ronald J. and Raes, Louis, Hawks and Doves at the FOMC (February 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10442. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2569271

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger (Contact Author)

Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2411 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Ronald J. Mahieu

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research, Econometrics and Finance Group ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2430 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3280 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/mahieu/

TiasNimbas Business School ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, North-Brabant 5071HS
Netherlands

Louis Raes

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - European Banking Center ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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