Interest for Delay in Payment of Money

English and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law, Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale, pp. 319-349, Louise Gullifer and Stefan Vogenauer, eds., Hart Publishing, 2014

Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 15/6

32 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2015

See all articles by Reinhard Zimmermann

Reinhard Zimmermann

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law

Abstract

The essay subjects the rules on interest on late payment contained in Art. 166-171 of the Draft Common European Sales Law (DCESL) to critical analysis and makes a proposal for a revision of these rules. It does not question the basic policy choices made by the European legislature; for this reason, the two Late Payment Directives are taken as a point of departure. The focus of the essay is on consistency, on the coherence of the ideas pursued, the device chosen to implement those ideas, and on rational justification for legal rules. In addition, the essay is based on the idea that the provisions in the DCESL need to be assessed against the background of the respective provisions in the national legal systems and of the many layers of text preceding the DCESL.

Note: This contribution is published in this Research Paper Series with the permission of the rights owner, Hart Publishing.

Keywords: late payment, interest, delay of performance, damages, interest rates, unfair contract terms, consumer protection, capitalization of interest, anatocism

Suggested Citation

Zimmermann, Reinhard, Interest for Delay in Payment of Money. English and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law, Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale, pp. 319-349, Louise Gullifer and Stefan Vogenauer, eds., Hart Publishing, 2014, Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 15/6, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2569660

Reinhard Zimmermann (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law ( email )

Mittelweg 187
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

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