Control Transfers in Corporate Germany: Their Frequency, Causes, and Consequences

36 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2001

Date Written: August 2001

Abstract

This study examines changes in block ownership for a large sample of listed and non-listed German firms. The frequency of block trading is similar to other countries, and the vast majority of block trades leads to changes in ultimate ownership (control transfers). Such changes are more likely for firms with high leverage, while they are less likely for larger firms and firms with high ownership concentration. Only for listed firms poor performance is related to more frequent control transfers. Control transfers are followed by increased management turnover, and for listed firms also by asset divestitures and employee layouts.

Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership structure, management turnover, restructuring

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J63

Suggested Citation

Koke, Jens F., Control Transfers in Corporate Germany: Their Frequency, Causes, and Consequences (August 2001). EFA 2001 Barcelona Meetings; ZEW Discussion Paper No. 00-67, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=256967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.256967

Jens F. Koke (Contact Author)

Allianz Group ( email )

Denmark

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