Experienced Financial Managers’ Views of the Relationships Among Self-Serving Attribution Bias, Overconfidence, and the Issuance of Management Forecasts: A Replication

Abstract

This paper independently replicates the results of the survey of experienced financial managers reported in section 4 of Libby and Rennekamp (2012). Using the same questions as Libby and Rennekamp (2012), we survey 110 experienced managers to examine their beliefs about the relationship between self-serving attribution bias, overconfidence, and management’s issuance of earnings forecasts. As in Libby and Rennekamp (2012), we find that participants agree that, in general, managers are overconfident. They also agree that other managers likely overestimate the extent to which they contribute to positive firm performance, and that both optimism about the firm’s future performance, as well as managers’ confidence in their ability to predict future performance, increase the likelihood that earnings forecasts are provided. Finally, participants agree that providing earnings forecasts amplifies the costs of negative outcomes and the benefits of positive outcomes, consistent with the experimental assumption in Libby and Rennekamp (2012). These findings suggest that the experimental findings in Libby and Rennekamp (2012) match experienced managers’ beliefs about how real-world earnings forecast decisions are made.

Keywords: Self-Serving Attribution Bias, Overconfidence, Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Guidance, Earnings Forecasts, Survey

JEL Classification: M41, M43, M44