Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Performance: The Influence of Boards, Ownership and Institutions

Barcelona GSE Working Paper No. 730

55 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2015 Last revised: 28 Nov 2015

See all articles by Kurt A. Desender

Kurt A. Desender

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Business Administration

Mircea Epure

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona School of Economics; UPF Barcelona School of Management

Date Written: November 1, 2015

Abstract

We analyze how ownership concentration and type, and board independence are related to corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing from agency, team production and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that the distribution of costs and benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders is crucial to understand what drives CSP. We analyze an international panel of listed firms and reveal that CSP is negatively related to ownership concentration, but positively to board independence. Furthermore, the ownership type and the business context matter. Ownership concentration is negatively related to CSP more strongly in shareholder-oriented societies. This negative relationship is weaker in egalitarian societies.

Keywords: corporate governance, corporate social performance, responsibility, agency theory, stakeholder theory, ownership, boards, institutions

JEL Classification: A13, G3, M0, M1, M14, M4, M41

Suggested Citation

Desender, Kurt A. and Epure, Mircea, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Performance: The Influence of Boards, Ownership and Institutions (November 1, 2015). Barcelona GSE Working Paper No. 730, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2570963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2570963

Kurt A. Desender

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Mircea Epure (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://mirceaepure.com

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

UPF Barcelona School of Management ( email )

Carrer de Balmes, 132, 134
Barcelona, 08008
Spain

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