A Resolvable Bank

Chapter in Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big to Fail, edited by Ken Scott and John Taylor (Stanford University Press, 2015) Forthcoming

33 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2015

See all articles by Thomas Huertas

Thomas Huertas

Center for Financial Studies; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Law and Finance

Date Written: February 7, 2015

Abstract

Making banks resolvable or “safe to fail” is a key component of the regulatory reform program enacted in response to the crisis. This paper designs a bank that will be resolvable, first for a bank in a single jurisdiction and then for a banking group with branches and/or subsidiaries in multiple jurisdictions. This involves three steps: granting customer obligations such as deposits preference over investor obligations; granting the resolution authority to bail-in the bank’s liabilities, starting with the investor obligations, and assuring that the bank has enough investor obligations outstanding for the bail-in to be sufficient to restore the bank’s common equity to at least the minimum required level. These steps assure the solvency of the bank-in-resolution and provide the basis for the bank-in-resolution to obtain liquidity. Together, the recapitalization and the liquidity provision should go a long way toward stabilizing the bank-in-resolution, assuring that it is able to continue to perform critical economic functions and paving the way for the resolution authorities to restructure the bank. Overall, this means resolution can occur without cost to the taxpayer and without significant disruption to the financial markets or the economy at large.

Keywords: banks, banking, resolution, too big to fail, depositor preference, bail-in

JEL Classification: G20, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Huertas, Thomas, A Resolvable Bank (February 7, 2015). Chapter in Making Failure Feasible: How Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big to Fail, edited by Ken Scott and John Taylor (Stanford University Press, 2015) Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2571176

Thomas Huertas (Contact Author)

Center for Financial Studies ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Goethe University
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt, 60323
Germany

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Law and Finance ( email )

Campus Westend - Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt, 60323
Germany

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