Old and Young Politicians

52 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2015 Last revised: 27 Oct 2022

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ugo antonio Troiano

University of California Riverside

Traviss Cassidy

University of Alabama

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2015

Abstract

We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Troiano, Ugo antonio and Cassidy, Traviss, Old and Young Politicians (February 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w20977, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572136

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Ugo antonio Troiano

University of California Riverside ( email )

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Riverside, CA 92521
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Traviss Cassidy

University of Alabama ( email )

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Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

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