57 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2015 Last revised: 3 Jun 2016
Date Written: May 18, 2016
The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures, thus creating a new avenue for political activism. This paper studies how corporations adjusted their political activism in response to this ruling. The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors, in particular public pension funds, have a preference for not using the new avenue for political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.
Keywords: Institutional Investors, Political Activism, Political Contributions, Political Connections, Citizens United
JEL Classification: G14, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Albuquerque, Rui A. and Lei, Zicheng and Rocholl, Jörg and Zhang, Chendi, Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism (May 18, 2016). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 470/2016; Paris December 2016 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2572666