Citizens United vs. FEC and Corporate Political Activism
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 60, No. 101547, 2020
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 470/2016
52 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2015 Last revised: 7 Jan 2022
There are 3 versions of this paper
Citizens United vs. FEC and Corporate Political Activism
Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism
Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism
Date Written: September 20, 2019
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect that the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision on Citizens United vs. FEC had on corporate political activism. The decision opened the door for corporate treasuries to engage in independent political spending. Politically connected firms have lower announcement returns at the ruling than non-connected firms. The estimates suggest that the value of a political connection decreases by $6.9 million. To evaluate the effect of Citizens United on corporate political activism, we explore the fact that Citizens United also lifts bans on independent political spending in states where such bans existed. After the ruling, firms headquartered in states where bans are lifted have fewer state-level connections relative to firms in other states. Overall, our evidence supports the hypothesis that independent political spending crowds out political connections. We do not find any significant crowding-out effects of independent political expenditures on lobbying activity, executive contributions, and political action committees (PAC) contributions.
Keywords: Corporate political activism, political connections, Citizens United, stock returns.
JEL Classification: G14, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation