Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks

SAFE Working Paper No. 88

31 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2015 Last revised: 15 Jul 2015

See all articles by Ester Faia

Ester Faia

Goethe University Frankfurt; Kiel Institute for the World Economy; University of Angers - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie Mathematique Appliquees a la Planification (CEPREMAP)

Beatrice Weder

University of Mainz - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2015

Abstract

Most recent regulations establish that resolution of global banking groups shall be done according to bail-in procedures and following a Single Point of Entry (SPE) as opposed to a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) approach. The latter requires parent holding of global groups to put up front the equity capital needed to absorb losses possibly emerging in foreign subsidiaries-branches. No model rationalized so far such resolution regime. We build a model of optimal design of resolution regimes and compare three regimes: SPE with cooperative authorities, SPE with non-cooperative authorities and MPE (ring-fencing). We find that the costs for bondholders of bail-inable instruments is generally higher under noncooperative regimes and ring-fencing. We also find that in those cases banks have ex ante incentives to reduce their exposure in foreign assets. We also examine recent case studies that help us rationalize the model results.

Keywords: single point of entry, multiple point of entry, strategic interaction of regulators, financial spillover, financial retrenchment

JEL Classification: G18, F3

Suggested Citation

Faia, Ester and Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks (March 1, 2015). SAFE Working Paper No. 88. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2572882

Ester Faia (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Kiel Institute for the World Economy

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, D-24100
Germany

University of Angers - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie Mathematique Appliquees a la Planification (CEPREMAP)

Ecole Normale Superieure
48 boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France

Beatrice Weder di Mauro

University of Mainz - Department of Economics ( email )

Chair of Corporate Finance
D-55099 Mainz, 55128
Germany
+49 613 1392 0144 (Phone)
+49 613 1392 5053 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
207
Abstract Views
1,127
rank
118,977
PlumX Metrics