Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered

47 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2001

See all articles by Rajesh K. Aggarwal

Rajesh K. Aggarwal

Northeastern University

Andrew A. Samwick

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2001

Abstract

We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which optimal incentive contracts mitigate managers' propensity to diversify their firms. In our model, managers may diversify for two reasons: to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to capture private benefits. We derive comparative static predictions for the equilibrium relationships between incentives, diversification, and firm performance. We then test our model. Consistent with prior studies, we find that firm performance is positively related to incentives and negatively related to diversification. We find that diversification is positively related to managerial incentives. We show that the negative relationship between diversification and managerial incentives that has been observed in prior work is the result of omitted variable bias. We also find that the link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not experience changes in diversification. These findings suggest that observed changes in diversification, incentives, and firm performance are equilibrium responses to changes in the level of private benefits that managers derive from diversification. Our evidence does not support the idea that managers diversify their firms to reduce their exposure to risk.

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. and Samwick, Andrew A., Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered (January 2001). AFA 2002 Atlanta Meetings; Amos Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 01-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=257371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.257371

Rajesh K. Aggarwal (Contact Author)

Northeastern University ( email )

413 Hayden Hall
360 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Andrew A. Samwick

Dartmouth College - Department of Economics ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-2893 (Phone)
603-646-2122 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~samwick

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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