Capital Markets Union for Europe - A Political Message to the UK

Law and Financial Markets Review 9 (2015), p. 5

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2015

6 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2015 Last revised: 26 Oct 2015

Wolf-Georg Ringe

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

Date Written: March 9, 2015

Abstract

The economic case for the recent proposal on a European ‘Capital Markets Union’ is obvious. However, the name is more symbolic than real, and the substance falls short of proposing a fully unified capital market across the EU.

This short paper identifies several shortcomings of the project. In particular, the unclear methodological approach of the CMU project, and the lack of a clear commitment to a European enforcement or institutional mechanism weaken the benefits of the overall concept. Instead, the merits of the proposal lie in its political importance: above all, the CMU project is an attempt to repair the relationship with the UK and to win back support from the City of London for the European Single Market. As such, the project as a whole is certainly laudable, and it might turn out to be the right step at the right time.

Keywords: capital markets union, European Union, single market, securities regulation, United Kingdom

JEL Classification: G38, K22, P16

Suggested Citation

Ringe, Wolf-Georg, Capital Markets Union for Europe - A Political Message to the UK (March 9, 2015). Law and Financial Markets Review 9 (2015), p. 5; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2575654 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2575654

Wolf-Georg Ringe (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

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Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49 40 42838 7787 (Phone)
+49 40 42838 6794 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ile-hamburg.de

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

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Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/people/wolf-georg-ringe

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