Copyright Licensing Under Asymmetric Information

26 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2015

See all articles by Ines Macho-Stadler

Ines Macho-Stadler

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

David Pérez-Castrillo

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 31, 2004

Abstract

In this paper we aim to contribute to the discussion on the role of royalties in copyright agreements by concentrating on the incentives that they provide to the creator and the intermediary when the success of the work depends on their involvement with the commercialization process. We also consider the effect of this moral hazard on the matching among creators and intermediaries and their gains.

Suggested Citation

Macho-Stadler, Ines and Pérez-Castrillo, David, Copyright Licensing Under Asymmetric Information (December 31, 2004). Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2014, 11(2), 1-26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2576669

Ines Macho-Stadler

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona ( email )

Departamento de Economia e Historia Economica
08193 Barcelona
Spain

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

David Pérez-Castrillo (Contact Author)

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain
(34 93) 381 1405 (Phone)
(34 93) 581 2012 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
Abstract Views
615
rank
420,939
PlumX Metrics