Earnings Management: The Effect of Ex Ante Earnings Expectations

Posted: 24 Apr 2001

See all articles by Jeff L. Payne

Jeff L. Payne

University of Kentucky - Von Allmen School of Accountancy

Sean W.G. Robb

University of Central Florida

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Abstract

SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has recently expressed concerns about the use of earnings management to meet Wall Street earnings expectations set by analysts' forecasts. We investigate whether managers aim to "meet or beat" analysts' forecasts and examine the influence of analysts' forecast dispersion on this aim. Our results are consistent with managers aligning earnings with market expectations established by analysts' forecasts. Additionally, our evidence is consistent with managers behaving as though they have greater incentives to increase income in settings where the dispersion in analysts' forecasts is low.

Keywords: Earnings management; Analysts; Forecasts; Discretionary accruals

JEL Classification: M41, M43, G29

Suggested Citation

Payne, Jeff L. and Robb, Sean W.G., Earnings Management: The Effect of Ex Ante Earnings Expectations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=257687

Jeff L. Payne (Contact Author)

University of Kentucky - Von Allmen School of Accountancy ( email )

Lexington, KY 40506
United States

Sean W.G. Robb

University of Central Florida ( email )

University of Central Florida
P.O. Box 161400
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
United States
407-823-4414 (Phone)

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