Term Length and the Quality of Appointments

15 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2001

See all articles by Amihai Glazer

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics

Vesa Kanniainen

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 2000

Abstract

Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent's term. Moreover, policies such as mandatory retirement which increase a prinicpal's concern for output after he leaves office, may induce better hiring.

Keywords: Hiring tenure, quality of appointment

JEL Classification: J20, J40

Suggested Citation

Glazer, Amihai and Kanniainen, Vesa, Term Length and the Quality of Appointments (December 2000). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 380. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=257789

Amihai Glazer

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States
949-854-6563 (Phone)
949-824-2182 (Fax)

Vesa Kanniainen (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358-0-9-1911 (Phone)
+358-0-191-8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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