Strategic Disclosure and CEO Media Visibility

69 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2015 Last revised: 15 Feb 2020

See all articles by Elizabeth Blankespoor

Elizabeth Blankespoor

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Ed deHaan

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Date Written: January 16, 2020

Abstract

Prior research indicates that CEO media visibility significantly impacts firm value and CEO career outcomes. We investigate whether and how CEOs strategically use disclosures to influence media coverage of themselves. We develop a measure of “CEO promotion” based on the CEO’s presence in firm press releases and the linguistic style of the CEO’s quotes. Determinants tests are consistent with our measure of CEO promotion being an intentional act based on cost/benefit considerations. Using our new measure, we find evidence consistent with CEO promotion being effective in reducing journalists’ production costs, thereby increasing CEO media coverage and spinning media articles in the firm’s favor. These results provide new insights as to specific ways in which CEOs influence media coverage. We also provide an empirical measure of abnormal CEO promotion that can be used in future research.

Keywords: CEO media visibility, CEO reputation, strategic voluntary disclosure, media, linguistic analysis

JEL Classification: L82, D83, M12, M41

Suggested Citation

Blankespoor, Elizabeth and deHaan, Ed, Strategic Disclosure and CEO Media Visibility (January 16, 2020). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-21, Forthcoming at Journal of Financial Reporting, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 204, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2577994 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2577994

Elizabeth Blankespoor

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

Ed DeHaan (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

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