Assemblies Matter: Analyzing the Choice of Form of Government in Unstable Democracies

33 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2015 Last revised: 6 Apr 2017

See all articles by Stephan Michel

Stephan Michel

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics

Date Written: April 5, 2017

Abstract

What are the factors driving the choice of the form of government? So far, it has been argued that higher income inequality makes a parliamentarian system less likely. Using a rational-choice model and focusing on a set of assumptions that fits well with unstable democracies, this paper finds that the composition of the constitutional assembly does play a key role for the choice of form of government. Who holds the majority in the constitutional assembly has a strong effect on the choice of form of government, especially when the policy conflict within the society (measured by income inequality in the model presented here) is high. This finding supports the case for a stronger focus on institutional details.

Keywords: Constitutional Choice, Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, Political Rent, Constitutional Assembly, Income Inequality, Unstable Democracies, Transition

JEL Classification: D72, D78, H11, K10

Suggested Citation

Michel, Stephan, Assemblies Matter: Analyzing the Choice of Form of Government in Unstable Democracies (April 5, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579573 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579573

Stephan Michel (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

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