Game Theoretic Models for Energy Production

18 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2015

See all articles by Michael Ludkovski

Michael Ludkovski

University of California, Santa Barbara

Ronnie Sircar

Princeton University - Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering

Date Written: March 17, 2015

Abstract

We give a selective survey of oligopoly models for energy production which capture to varying degrees issues such as exhaustibility of fossil fuels, development of renewable sources, exploration and new technologies, and changing costs of production. Our main focus is on dynamic Cournot competition with exhaustible resources. We trace the resulting theory of competitive equilibria and discuss some of the major emerging strands, including competition between renewable and exhaustible producers, endogenous market phase transitions, stochastic differential games with controlled jumps, and mean field games.

Keywords: dynamic games, energy production, Cournot and Bertrand markets, exhaustible resources

Suggested Citation

Ludkovski, Mike and Sircar, Ronnie, Game Theoretic Models for Energy Production (March 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579610 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579610

Mike Ludkovski (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Barbara ( email )

Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.pstat.ucsb.edu/faculty/ludkovski

Ronnie Sircar

Princeton University - Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

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