Policy Outcomes of Single and Double-Ballot Elections

IEB Working Paper No. 2014/38

42 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2015

See all articles by Massimiliano Ferraresi

Massimiliano Ferraresi

University of Ferrara

Leonzio Rizzo

University of Ferrara - Faculty of Economics

Alberto Zanardi

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001-2007 to empirically test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him, while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule where multiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones.

Keywords: Federal budget, double-ballot, coalition, list, taxes, expenditure

JEL Classification: H3, H21, H77

Suggested Citation

Ferraresi, Massimiliano and Rizzo, Leonzio and Zanardi, Alberto, Policy Outcomes of Single and Double-Ballot Elections (2014). IEB Working Paper No. 2014/38, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579782 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579782

Massimiliano Ferraresi

University of Ferrara ( email )

Via del Gregorio 13
Ferrara, 44100
Italy

Leonzio Rizzo (Contact Author)

University of Ferrara - Faculty of Economics ( email )

C.so Ercole I° d'Este 37
Ferrara, 44100
Italy

Alberto Zanardi

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 58365337 (Phone)
+39 02 58365318 (Fax)

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