Context-Dependent Cheating: Experimental Evidence from 16 Countries

24 Pages Posted: 1 Apr 2015

See all articles by David Pascual‐Ezama

David Pascual‐Ezama

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)

Toke Fosgaard

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics

Juan-Camilo Cárdenas

Universidad de Los Andes

Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University

Robert Ferec Veszteg

Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU)

Beatriz Gil-Gómez de Liaño

Department of Social Psychology and Methodology, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Brian Gunia

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Doris Weichselbaumer

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Katharina Hilken

Department of Applied Economics, Free University of Brussels (VUB)

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business; United Nations Development Program

Joyce Delnoij

Utrecht University - School of Economics

Antonios Proestakis

Joint Research Center of the European Commission

Michael Tira

University of Padua - Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale

Yulius Pratomo

Satya Wacana Christian University

Tarek Jaber-López

Jaume I University

Pablo Brañas-Garza

Middlesex University - Economics Department

Date Written: March 4, 2015

Abstract

Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries. This paper explores the honesty among citizens across sixteen countries with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face a trade-off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self-concept because of lying. Despite the incentives to cheat, we find that individuals are mostly honest. Further, international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens' honesty for our sample countries.

Keywords: Honesty, corruption, cultural differences

JEL Classification: D73, C93, D01

Suggested Citation

Pascual‐Ezama, David and Fosgaard, Toke and Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo and Kujal, Praveen and Veszteg, Robert Ferec and Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz and Gunia, Brian and Weichselbaumer, Doris and Hilken, Katharina and Antinyan, Armenak and Delnoij, Joyce and Proestakis, Antonios and Tira, Michael and Pratomo, Yulius and Jaber-López, Tarek and Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Context-Dependent Cheating: Experimental Evidence from 16 Countries (March 4, 2015). Documento CEDE No. 2015-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2579926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579926

David Pascual‐Ezama

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) ( email )

Carretera de Humera s/n
Madrid, Madrid 28223
Spain

Toke Fosgaard

University of Copenhagen - Institute of Food and Resource Economics ( email )

Rolighedsvej 25
Copenhagen, 1958
Denmark

Juan-Camilo Cárdenas (Contact Author)

Universidad de Los Andes ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia
339-4949 ext. 2473 (Phone)

Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University ( email )

The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

Robert Ferec Veszteg

Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU) ( email )

Barrio Sarriena s/n
Leioa, Bizkaia 48940
Spain

Beatriz Gil-Gómez de Liaño

Department of Social Psychology and Methodology, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid ( email )

Campus Cantoblanco
C/Kelsen, 1
Madrid, Madrid 28049
Spain

Brian Gunia

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

Doris Weichselbaumer

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics ( email )

Altenbergerstrasse 69
A-4040 Linz, 4040
Austria
+43 732 2468 8240 (Phone)
+43 732 2468 9679 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Katharina Hilken

Department of Applied Economics, Free University of Brussels (VUB) ( email )

Pleinlaan 2
http://www.vub.ac.be/
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business ( email )

No.143, Wuluo Road
Wuhan, Hubei 430073
China

United Nations Development Program ( email )

Petros Adamyan 14
Yerevan, 0010
Armenia

Joyce Delnoij

Utrecht University - School of Economics ( email )

Kriekenpitplein 21-22
Adam Smith Building
Utrecht, +31 30 253 7373 3584 EC
Netherlands

Antonios Proestakis

Joint Research Center of the European Commission ( email )

Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Michael Tira

University of Padua - Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale ( email )

via Venezia 8
Padova, 35131
Italy

Yulius Pratomo

Satya Wacana Christian University ( email )

Diponegoro Street 52-60
Salatiga, Central Java 50711
Indonesia

Tarek Jaber-López

Jaume I University ( email )

Castellon
E-12071 Castello de la Plana, Castellón de la Plana 12071
Spain

Pablo Brañas-Garza

Middlesex University - Economics Department ( email )

The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

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