Sound Auction Specification and Implementation

28 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2015

See all articles by Marco Caminati

Marco Caminati

University of Birmingham - School of Computer Science

Manfred Kerber

University of Birmingham - School of Computer Science

Christoph Lange

University of Bonn

Colin Rowat

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 10, 2015

Abstract

We introduce 'formal methods' of mechanized reasoning from computer science to address two problems in auction design and practice: is a given auction design soundly specified, possessing its intended properties; and, is the design faithfully implemented when actually run? Failure on either front can be hugely costly in large auctions. In the familiar setting of the combinatorial Vickrey auction, we use a mechanized reasoner, Isabelle, to first ensure that the auction has a set of desired properties (e.g. allocating all items at non-negative prices), and to then generate verified executable code directly from the specified design. Having established the expected results in a known context, we intend next to use formal methods to verify new auction designs.

Suggested Citation

Caminati, Marco and Kerber, Manfred and Lange, Christoph and Rowat, Colin, Sound Auction Specification and Implementation (March 10, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580331 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580331

Marco Caminati

University of Birmingham - School of Computer Science ( email )

United Kingdom

Manfred Kerber

University of Birmingham - School of Computer Science ( email )

Edgbaston
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT B17 0JH
United Kingdom

Christoph Lange

University of Bonn ( email )

Regina-Pacis-Weg 3
Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

Colin Rowat (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
+44 121 414 3754 (Phone)
+44 121 414 7377 (Fax)

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