An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform

36 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2015

See all articles by Carlo Drago

Carlo Drago

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano"

Roberto Ricciuti

University of Verona - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Paolo Santella

Single Resolution Board

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 19, 2015

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.

Keywords: interlocking directorships, corporate governance, community detection, social networks.

JEL Classification: C4, C60, G34, G38, L14

Suggested Citation

Drago, Carlo and Ricciuti, Roberto and Santella, Paolo, An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform (March 19, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580700 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580700

Carlo Drago (Contact Author)

University of Rome "Niccolò Cusano" ( email )

Via Don Carlo Gnocchi, 3
Rome, 00166
Italy

Roberto Ricciuti

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paolo Santella

Single Resolution Board

Rue de la Science 27
Bruxelles, 1000
Belgium

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