On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination

47 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2015 Last revised: 11 Apr 2015

See all articles by Attila Ambrus

Attila Ambrus

Duke University - Department of Economics

Yuhta Ishii

Pennsylvania State University

Date Written: March 23, 2015

Abstract

This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for play ultimately being absorbed in the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of the stage game, for every Markov perfect equilibrium. For players patient enough, the condition is that the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is also risk dominant, but for lower levels of patience the condition departs from simple risk-dominance. For general n-player symmetric games with patient players, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium to be the unique limit outcome in all symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is a particular generalization of risk-dominance for more than two players. We provide extensions to the unique selection results to all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and to coordination games in which different players prefer different Nash equilibria of the stage game.

Keywords: repeated games, asynchronous moves, coordination, equilibrium selection

JEL Classification: C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Ambrus, Attila and Ishii, Yuhta, On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination (March 23, 2015). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 185. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584631 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2584631

Attila Ambrus (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Yuhta Ishii

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

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