EU Foreign Policy Under the Doctrine of Implied Powers: Codification Drawbacks and Constitutional Limitations

39 (4) European Law Review 511-530

Posted: 27 Mar 2015

See all articles by Theodore Konstadinides

Theodore Konstadinides

University of Essex; School of Law, University of Essex

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

In recent years, the proliferation of EU powers to enter into international obligations has raised concerns about the respect the EU places upon Member States’ autonomy to conduct foreign policy at the national level. This article provides a fresh take on the EU doctrine of implied powers by examining its current scope as well as its implications for national autonomy to unilaterally conclude international agreements. Since the doctrine has been encapsulated in the Lisbon Treaty, the article provides a discussion of the constitutionalisation of EU implied external powers and offers new insights into established case law. It discusses whether the Lisbon codification is a shorthand solution which does little justice to the otherwise detailed jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in ensuring the proper balancing of powers between the EU and the Member States in the foreign policy realm.

Keywords: EU constitutional law; EU external relations; division of powers; competence

Suggested Citation

Konstadinides, Theodore and Konstadinides, Theodore, EU Foreign Policy Under the Doctrine of Implied Powers: Codification Drawbacks and Constitutional Limitations (2014). 39 (4) European Law Review 511-530, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584994

Theodore Konstadinides (Contact Author)

School of Law, University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.essex.ac.uk/law/staff/profile.aspx?ID=5123

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Room 5S.4.9A
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.essex.ac.uk/law/staff/profile.aspx?ID=5123

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