Assigning More Students to Their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison

35 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2015 Last revised: 23 Jun 2015

See all articles by Itai Ashlagi

Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering

Afshin Nikzad

Stanford University - Economics Department

Assaf I Romm

Harvard University

Date Written: June 2015

Abstract

School choice districts that implement stable matchings face various design issues that impact students' assignments to schools. We study properties of the rank distribution of students with random preferences, when schools use different tiebreaking rules to rank equivalent students. Under a multiple tiebreaking rule a vanishing fraction of students match to one of their top choices, in contrast to a single tiebreaking rule under which a constant fraction of students are assigned to one of their top choices. When students can submit only a relatively short preference list, the multiple tiebreaking rule allows a constant fraction of students to match to one of their top choices, with only a ''small'' fraction of students remaining unmatched.

JEL Classification: D47, C78

Suggested Citation

Ashlagi, Itai and Nikzad, Afshin and Romm, Assaf I, Assigning More Students to Their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison (June 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585367 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2585367

Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering ( email )

473 Via Ortega
Stanford, CA 94305-9025
United States

Afshin Nikzad (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Economics Department ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

HOME PAGE: http://stanford.edu/~nikzad

Assaf I Romm

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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