Reconsidering Copyright: A Spatial Model of Differentiated Competition and Infringement

14 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2015 Last revised: 13 Jul 2016

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Gilad Sorek

Auburn University

Lawrence J. Spiwak

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Date Written: June 12, 2016

Abstract

In practice, copyright is treated by economists and analysts as a tradeoff between monopoly and the incentive to create new works. This tradeoff is between stark opposites – power and innovation. Yet, in reality, copyrighted works face numerous close substitutes. In this paper, we formally model copyright using an approach better suited to the nature of copyrighted works – a model of differentiated-goods competition. We discuss the consequences of improperly viewing copyright as monopoly. While theoretically formal, the paper is intended to inform public policy with respect to copyright and is thus presented in a way accessible to the non-economist.

Keywords: Intellectual Property, Copyright

JEL Classification: O34

Suggested Citation

Beard, Thomas Randolph and Ford, George S. and Sorek, Gilad and Spiwak, Lawrence J., Reconsidering Copyright: A Spatial Model of Differentiated Competition and Infringement (June 12, 2016). TPRC 43: The 43rd Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2585748

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

Gilad Sorek

Auburn University ( email )

415 West Magnolia Avenue
Auburn, AL 36849
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cla.auburn.edu/economics/directory/professorial-faculty/gilad-sorek

Lawrence J. Spiwak (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
202-274-0235 (Phone)
202-318-4909 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.phoenix-center.org

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