Coercive vs. Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of Enforcement Approach on Environmental Management

13 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2015

See all articles by Dietrich Earnhart

Dietrich Earnhart

University of Kansas - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Robert L. Glicksman

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

A spirited debate explores the comparative merits of two different approaches to the enforcement of regulatory law: the coercive approach, which emphasizes the deterrence of noncompliance through inflexibly imposed sanctions, and the cooperative approach, which emphasizes the inducement of compliance through flexibility and assistance. Both scholarly and policymaking communities are interested in this topic of enforcement approach within the realms of finance, tax compliance, occupational safety, food and drug safety, consumer product safety, and environmental protection. To inform this debate, our study explores enforcement of environmental protection laws where the debate has been especially spirited yet lacking in much empirical evidence. Specifically our study empirically analyzes the effects of these two approaches on environmental management practices linked to compliance with wastewater discharge limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities. For this analysis, we view the enforcement approach as representing a relationship between a regulator and a regulated entity that is measured in multiple dimensions so that we are able to explore the extent of cooperation or coercion. The empirical results reveal that a more cooperative relationship induces better environmental management.

Keywords: Environmental management, Compliance, Enforcement approach, Self-audits

Suggested Citation

Earnhart, Dietrich and Glicksman, Robert L., Coercive vs. Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of Enforcement Approach on Environmental Management (2015). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 42, p. 135, 2015, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-7, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586094

Dietrich Earnhart

University of Kansas - Department of Economics ( email )

Lawrence, KS 66049
United States
785-864-2866 (Phone)
785-864-5270 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Robert L. Glicksman (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4641 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/profile.aspx?id=16085

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
96
Abstract Views
734
rank
367,882
PlumX Metrics