Empirical Evidence of the Zero-Sum Game Fallacy

Abstract

The zero-sum fallacy claims that lack of cooperation may result from the belief that resources are fixed even when they are not. While the economic theory community has previously studied this fallacy, often focusing in poverty, unemployment, retirement, and immigration, it remains unknown whether it is internalized at the psychological level. This motivated us to investigate whether the zero-sum fallacy plays influences in people’s reluctance to cooperate. To this aim we asked participants to repeatedly play the 'thumb war game,' where each player scores a point when she pins the opponent's thumb. The goal was making as many points as possible in a minute, rewarded by a monetary payoff per point. The game is not zero-sum, since the number of games in a minute depends on the players’ strategies. By agreeing to play quick games alternating the winner, both players can attain more points than when engaged in competition. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Participants played a second game after we emphasized the goal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of willingness to cooperate but instead from an internalization of the zero-sum fallacy. Our game can be thought as representing behavior at not signalized intersections in urban areas, where drivers tacitly negotiate who goes first. That negotiation takes time that is tragically wasted, and contributes to the $121 billion estimated cost of congestion. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may thus have vast practical consequences in our society.

Keywords: Behavioral Game Theory, Cooperation, Zero-sum fallacy