Masking Information Source within the Internal Revenue Service

Forthcoming in Blinding as a Solution to Bias (Aaron S. Kesselheim & Christopher Robertson, eds.). Elsevier.

Posted: 30 Mar 2015

See all articles by Karie Davis-Nozemack

Karie Davis-Nozemack

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Date Written: March 27, 2015

Abstract

Strategic ignorance rarely has been an official U.S. administrative policy. Rather, sunshine and transparency have been the rally cry for those seeking to combat discrimination, bias, and corruption. Strategic ignorance, however, may have greater utility for government administration than may initially appear. This chapter examines the use of strategic ignorance of informational source to facilitate tax enforcement. Specifically, this chapter contemplates applying the lessons of scientific trial literature to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax whistleblower program to eliminate bias against the use of whistleblowers at certain decision points in tax enforcement.

Keywords: tax, Internal Revenue Service, whistleblower, bias, cognitive bias, blinding, allocation concealment

JEL Classification: k23, k34

Suggested Citation

Davis-Nozemack, Karie, Masking Information Source within the Internal Revenue Service (March 27, 2015). Forthcoming in Blinding as a Solution to Bias (Aaron S. Kesselheim & Christopher Robertson, eds.). Elsevier., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586201

Karie Davis-Nozemack (Contact Author)

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.scheller.gatech.edu/directory/faculty/davis-nozemack/index.html

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