Masking Information Source within the Internal Revenue Service
Forthcoming in Blinding as a Solution to Bias (Aaron S. Kesselheim & Christopher Robertson, eds.). Elsevier.
Posted: 30 Mar 2015
Date Written: March 27, 2015
Abstract
Strategic ignorance rarely has been an official U.S. administrative policy. Rather, sunshine and transparency have been the rally cry for those seeking to combat discrimination, bias, and corruption. Strategic ignorance, however, may have greater utility for government administration than may initially appear. This chapter examines the use of strategic ignorance of informational source to facilitate tax enforcement. Specifically, this chapter contemplates applying the lessons of scientific trial literature to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax whistleblower program to eliminate bias against the use of whistleblowers at certain decision points in tax enforcement.
Keywords: tax, Internal Revenue Service, whistleblower, bias, cognitive bias, blinding, allocation concealment
JEL Classification: k23, k34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Karie Davis-Nozemack (Contact Author)
Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )
800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.scheller.gatech.edu/directory/faculty/davis-nozemack/index.html