Tax Compliance as a Wicked System
41 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2015 Last revised: 2 Sep 2016
Date Written: 2016
This paper proposes a new typology and framework for tax compliance systems. Traditionally-competing approaches such as deterrence theory, behaviorist theory, and game theoretic models taken together suggest that tax compliance is perhaps a new type of system — a “wicked system” — that is only partially comprehensible by understanding the traditional theories alone. If correct, previously competing theories become simply different limiting cases of the same underlying “wicked system.” The paper concludes with a discussion of the framework’s limitations and presents initial solutions and challenges for future work.
Keywords: tax compliance, audits, complexity, deterrence, behavioral economics, wicked problems
JEL Classification: E62, H26, H24, H25, K34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation