Tax Compliance as a Wicked System

41 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2015 Last revised: 2 Sep 2016

See all articles by Jack Manhire

Jack Manhire

Texas A&M University School of Innovation; Bush School of Government & Public Service

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

This paper proposes a new typology and framework for tax compliance systems. Traditionally-competing approaches such as deterrence theory, behaviorist theory, and game theoretic models taken together suggest that tax compliance is perhaps a new type of system — a “wicked system” — that is only partially comprehensible by understanding the traditional theories alone. If correct, previously competing theories become simply different limiting cases of the same underlying “wicked system.” The paper concludes with a discussion of the framework’s limitations and presents initial solutions and challenges for future work.

Keywords: tax compliance, audits, complexity, deterrence, behavioral economics, wicked problems

JEL Classification: E62, H26, H24, H25, K34

Suggested Citation

Manhire, Jack, Tax Compliance as a Wicked System (2016). 18 Florida Tax Review 235 (2016), Texas A&M University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-29, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586556 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2586556

Jack Manhire (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University School of Innovation

1249 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843-1249
United States

Bush School of Government & Public Service ( email )

4220 TAMU
College Station, TX 76845
United States

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