Forthcoming in 11 (2015) Journal of Competition Law & Economics
38 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2015 Last revised: 11 Oct 2015
Date Written: March 28, 2015
In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commission that condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusive rebates and “naked restrictions”. This judgement, in which the GCEU considered that in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal has been subject to many criticisms as not in line with the teachings of economics. This paper discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace it by a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case-law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.
Keywords: loyalty rebates, exclusive dealing, Intel case, EU competition law, antitrust, foreclosure
JEL Classification: D40, K21, L2, L22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Geradin, Damien, Loyalty Rebates after Intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to Overrule Hoffman-La Roche (March 28, 2015). Forthcoming in 11 (2015) Journal of Competition Law & Economics; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 15-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2586584