The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match

85 Pages Posted: 30 Mar 2015 Last revised: 31 Mar 2015

See all articles by Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Duke University - Department of Economics

Nikhil Agarwal

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2015

Abstract

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC’s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80% of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.

Suggested Citation

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Agarwal, Nikhil and Pathak, Parag A., The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match (March 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21046. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586899

Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Contact Author)

Duke University - Department of Economics ( email )

213 Social Sciences Building
Box 90097
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Nikhil Agarwal

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Parag A. Pathak

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

50 Memorial Drive
E52-391
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

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