Cross‐Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity

16 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2015

See all articles by Alireza Naghavi

Alireza Naghavi

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Yingyi Tsai

National University of Kaohsiung

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2015

Abstract

This article studies the cross‐border protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) as an outcome of a contract obtained through a Nash bargaining process between an innovative North and an imitative South. The level of disclosure required in such contract is higher, the more capable is the South in copying if bargaining breaks down. This raises questions about the suitability of universal IPR standards through a single contract. The threat of a penalty in case of non‐compliance can, however, reduce the outside option of more advanced countries and make a stricter IPR regime enforceable by harmonizing their interests with relatively less developed nations.

Suggested Citation

Naghavi, Alireza and Tsai, Yingyi, Cross‐Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity (May 2015). Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62, Issue 2, pp. 211-226, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2588847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12071

Alireza Naghavi (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://alirezanaghavi.altervista.org/

Yingyi Tsai

National University of Kaohsiung ( email )

Department of Applied Economics
700 Kaohsiung University Rd
Kaohsiung, 811
Taiwan
+886 7 5919189 (Phone)
+886 7 2169365 (Fax)

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