Dynamic Investment and Deterrence in the U.S. Cement Industry

67 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2015

Date Written: December 31, 2013

Abstract

Many industries experience periods of excess capacity. Explanations include firms deterring rivals, anticipating future demand, or the lumpiness of investment. This paper identifies capacity investment intended to deter rivals separately from investment driven by other factors. To achieve this goal, I estimate a new model of spatial price competition and embed it in a dynamic game of investment. I apply my model to the United States portland cement industry from 1949 to 1969, a period over which capacity utilization dropped 23% nationally. I find that deterrence explains almost all of the industry's excess capacity.

Keywords: dynamic investment, spatial demand, portland cement

JEL Classification: L1, L11, L13, L61, D24

Suggested Citation

Chicu, Mark, Dynamic Investment and Deterrence in the U.S. Cement Industry (December 31, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2589580 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2589580

Mark Chicu (Contact Author)

Bates White ( email )

1300 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
83
Abstract Views
566
rank
322,359
PlumX Metrics