Banking Union and the Governance of Credit Institutions - A Legal Perspective

SAFE Working Paper No. 96/2015

30 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2015 Last revised: 10 Apr 2015

See all articles by Jens-Hinrich Binder

Jens-Hinrich Binder

Eberhard-Karls-University - Faculty of Law; London School of Economics - Law School; EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence

Date Written: April 8, 2015

Abstract

The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions’ organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could – and should – be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?

Keywords: Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism, Banking Regulation, Bank Corporate Governance

JEL Classification: G15, G21, G28, K22, K23

Suggested Citation

Binder, Jens-Hinrich, Banking Union and the Governance of Credit Institutions - A Legal Perspective (April 8, 2015). SAFE Working Paper No. 96/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2591817

Jens-Hinrich Binder (Contact Author)

Eberhard-Karls-University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz
Tuebingen, 72074
Germany
++49-(0)-7071-29-76119 (Phone)
++49-(0)-7071-29-35283 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/professoren_und_dozenten/binder

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ( email )

Italy

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