Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics
Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pp. 259-289, December 2015
28 Pages Posted: 9 Apr 2015 Last revised: 24 Aug 2016
Date Written: March 1, 2015
This paper analyzes the pillar of modern central bank governance, i.e. central bank independence, highlighting three contributions. First, we provide a systematic review of the economics of central bank independence. Second, using a principal agent model we design a political economy framework, which explains how politicians can shape central bank governance in addressing macroeconomic shocks, taking into account both the wishes of the citizens and their own personal interests. This framework is then used to interpret the evolution of central bank independence from the Great Inflation throughout the Great Moderation – i.e. from the seventies to the first decade of the twenty-first century – and to the Great Recession during which recent reforms have shaken the design of the central banks by increasing their involvement in banking and financial supervision. Finally, we provide empirical evidence supporting this evolution of central bank independence using recently developed indices of dynamic central bank independence.
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Independence, Banking Supervision, Global Financial Crisis.
JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, E62
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation