Two-Pronged Control of Natural Resources: Prices and Quantities with Lobbying

45 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2015

See all articles by Israel Finkelshtain

Israel Finkelshtain

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Iddo Kan

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Agricultural Economics and Management

Yoav Kislev

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Date Written: April 9, 2015

Abstract

This study offers an extension of Grossman and Helpman (1994) political-economic framework to model an industry regulated by an integrated system of both direct and market-based policies. The model is incorporated into a normative theoretical analysis and serves as a basis for structural econometric estimations. Utilizing disaggregated data on agriculture and irrigation in Israel in the mid-1980s, when water was regulated by both quotas and prices, the model’s political and technological parameters are structurally estimated and used to assess the relative efficiencies of quotas, prices, and an integrated regulation regime.

Keywords: Institutional Corruption, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Agriculture, Water

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Finkelshtain, Israel and Kan, Iddo and Kislev, Yoav, Two-Pronged Control of Natural Resources: Prices and Quantities with Lobbying (April 9, 2015). Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 60. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2592687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592687

Israel Finkelshtain (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem 91905, IL Jerusalem 91905
Israel
+08-9489255 (Phone)

Iddo Kan

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Agricultural Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 12
Rehovot, 76100
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://nrerc.haifa.ac.il/members/kan.htm

Yoav Kislev

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Faculty of Agriculture
Jerusalem 91905
Israel
972-8-481-230 (Phone)
972-8-466-267 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
50
Abstract Views
759
PlumX Metrics