Facilitating Strategic Management Through Stakeholder Engagement and Regulatory Models

Abstract

The sceptism and doubts which revolve about the unwillingness to accord due recognition to “a well-posed self-regulation approach” to corporate social responsibility, according to Sacconi, can be illustrated with two arguments, one of which is, namely:

That any multi-stakeholder approach to strategic management and governance of firms, does not facilitate or enhance the uniqueness of goal and direction of management.

As well as proposing a self regulation approach which consolidates on Sacconi’s idea of corporate social responsibility as a model of extended corporate governance, this chapter is also aimed at consolidating on the finding that “firms combine activities when internal governance costs are less than market transaction costs.” In so doing it contributes to the extant literature and debates on corporate social responsibility, as well as Spulber’s views on Coase’s Theorem and the “strategic innovation game.”

Keywords: Cooperative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation model, Coase’s Theorem, corporate social responsibility, residual property right, incomplete contracts, corporate governance, accountability, principal agent theory, stakeholder theory