History of Cooperation: A Positive Analysis of the Overlapping Mechanism

22 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2015

See all articles by Mao Fukadai

Mao Fukadai

Ochanomizu University, Department of Information Sciences, Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences

Keigo Inukai

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Date Written: April 9, 2015

Abstract

Given that cooperation can lead to a large cost for an individual there must be some social mechanisms maintaining this behavior. Recently, some economists have used game theory to provide a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms at play. For instance using the overlapping generation game, it has been shown that rewards and penalties given in the past and those perceived to occur in the future has a large influence on the players willingness to cooperate. However while these mathematical arguments are persuasive whether such equilibrium exists in the real world requires empirical observation. To date there are some empirical evidence focused on case studies but these tend to lack enough information to validate the theory. Therefore our objective is to provide evidence for the theory that the overlapping mechanism influences cooperative behavior by using the overlapping generation game in economic experiments. We would like to show how the path of the equilibrium is affected by the history of previous subject’s choices through comparing a game with and without an overlapping mechanism.

Keywords: cooperation, mechanism, overlapping, social preference

JEL Classification: C92, D03

Suggested Citation

Fukadai, Mao and Inukai, Keigo, History of Cooperation: A Positive Analysis of the Overlapping Mechanism (April 9, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2592822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592822

Mao Fukadai (Contact Author)

Ochanomizu University, Department of Information Sciences, Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences ( email )

2-1-1 Ohtsuka
Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku 112-8610
Japan

Keigo Inukai

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Suita, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

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