Why an Original Can Be Better than a Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation

32 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2001

See all articles by Michelle Burtis

Michelle Burtis

Charles River Associates (CRA) International

Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University - School of Law

Abstract

In "In re Independent Service Organization Antitrust Litigation", the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Xerox corporation's refusal to sell or license its patented parts, copyrighted manuals, and patented and copyrighted software to independent service organizations did not violate the antitrust laws. Plaintiffs have filed a writ of certiorari based on the claim that the Federal Circuit's holding is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit's antitrust holdings in Image Technical Services v. Kodak. In this paper, we argue that this conflict is largely illusory. The decision in the Xerox case is exactly the result contemplated when the Federal Circuit was created - the recognition and uniform treatment of the patent holder's rights under the statutory patent grant. The Xerox decision does not go beyond this, and a comparison of these two decisions does not present a compelling case for the Court to unify their outcomes by reversing Xerox.

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L41, O34

Suggested Citation

Burtis, Michelle and Kobayashi, Bruce H., Why an Original Can Be Better than a Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation. Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 9, 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259297 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.259297

Michelle Burtis (Contact Author)

Charles River Associates (CRA) International ( email )

1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States

Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University - School of Law ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8034 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~bkobayas

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