Emergent Orders of Worth: Must We Agree on More than a Price?

Cosmos and Taxis 4(1), February 2017: 23-34.

12 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2015 Last revised: 11 Mar 2017

See all articles by Pavel Kuchař

Pavel Kuchař

University of Bristol

Erwin Dekker

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Date Written: April 29, 2016

Abstract

Market exchanges are widely believed to rely on an overlap of interest, this paper argues that many market exchanges actually rely on a broader agreement between buyer and seller. The broader agreement includes the moral justification of the exchange and the associated norms of propriety. To arrive at this broader agreement markets rely on systems of non-price coordination. These non-price coordination systems, or orders of worth as we call them, can be thought of as emergent orders just like the price system is an emergent order; they are sources of justification that can be drawn upon to warrant the worth of diverse artifacts and the legitimacy of trading them. We show that Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy offers conceptual means for analyzing the emergence of such orders. To make sense of the emergence and functioning on these orders we draw on Smith's organon and link it with contemporary work in economic sociology by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot. We demonstrate how our theoretical framework can further our understanding of justifying exchanges of contested goods with two illustrative cases: contemporary art and surrogate motherhood.

Keywords: Non-price coordination, spontaneous order, social norms, sympathy

JEL Classification: A13, B12, D02, D46, L26, Z13

Suggested Citation

Kuchař, Pavel and Dekker, Erwin, Emergent Orders of Worth: Must We Agree on More than a Price? (April 29, 2016). Cosmos and Taxis 4(1), February 2017: 23-34.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2592978 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592978

Pavel Kuchař (Contact Author)

University of Bristol ( email )

8 Woodland Road
Bristol BS8 ITN
United Kingdom

Erwin Dekker

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland 3062PA
Netherlands

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