Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict
40 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2015 Last revised: 4 Jun 2018
Date Written: April 9, 2018
A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore non-concession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and non-duration dependent.
Keywords: Intimidation, reputation, terrorism, negotiation, brinkmanship, costly war-of-attrition
JEL Classification: D74, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation