Democracy with Group Identity

49 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2015

See all articles by Arye L. Hillman

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kfir Metsuyanim

Government of the State of Israel

Niklas Potrafke

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Date Written: March 31, 2015

Abstract

Group-based identity undermines democracy by impeding democratic change of government. A substantial literature has therefore studied how to make democracy consistent with group identity. We contribute to this literature by introducing the role of group decisiveness into voting incentives and mobilization of voters. In the elections that we study, for the same populations, accounting for income and other influences, group identity increased voter turnout on average by some 8 percentage points in local elections and decreased voter turnout by some 20 percentage points in national elections. We empirically investigate the effect of group identity on voter turnout and also evaluate whether group identity resulted in budgetary imbalance or replacement of local government because of disfunctionality. Our general contribution is to show how democracy can persist with group identity, although democracy in such instances differs from usual political competition.

Keywords: voting turnout, voter decisiveness, expressive voting, instrumental voting, local government, Arab Spring

JEL Classification: D030, D720, D740, H770

Suggested Citation

Hillman, Arye L. and Metsuyanim, Kfir and Potrafke, Niklas, Democracy with Group Identity (March 31, 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5281, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2593702

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+97 29 774 6424 (Phone)
+97 29 771 5628 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Kfir Metsuyanim

Government of the State of Israel

Jerusalem
Israel

Niklas Potrafke (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
355
PlumX Metrics