Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets

48 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2001 Last revised: 21 Oct 2010

See all articles by Olivier J. Blanchard

Olivier J. Blanchard

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

Francesco Giavazzi

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2001

Abstract

Product and labor market deregulation are fundamentally about reducing and redistributing rents, leading economic players to adjust in turn to this new distribution. Thus, even if deregulation eventually proves beneficial, it comes with strong distribution and dynamic effects. The transition may imply the decline of incumbent firms. Unemployment may increase for a while. Real wages may decrease before recovering, and so on. To study these issues, we build a model based on two central assumptions: Monopolistic competition in the goods market, which determines the size of rents; and bargaining in the labor market, which determines the distribution of rents between workers and firms. We then think of product market regulation as determining both the entry costs faced by firms, and the degree of competition between firms. We think of labor market regulation as determining the bargaining power of workers. Having characterized the effects of labor and product market deregulation, we then use our results to study two specific issues. First, to shed light on macroeconomic evolutions in Europe over the last twenty years, in particular on the behavior of the labor share. Second, to look at political economy interactions between product and labor market deregulation.

Suggested Citation

Blanchard, Olivier J. and Giavazzi, Francesco, Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets (February 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8120. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259427

Olivier J. Blanchard (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
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Francesco Giavazzi

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) ( email )

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Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 3304 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 3302 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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