Incentives for Process Innovations Under Discrete Structural Alternatives of Competition Policy

40 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2015

See all articles by Andrey Shastitko

Andrey Shastitko

Lomonossov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Moscow Campus

Alexander Kurdin

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Moscow Campus; Moscow State University - Faculty of Economics; National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: April 14, 2015

Abstract

This study analyses the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing, markets are characterized by technological leadership or technological competition. The results of modelling show that the uncertainty engendered by technological competition may lower the intensity of innovative activities, if there are no mechanisms of coordination between participants. Voluntary licensing generally improves social welfare but does not guarantee an increase in innovative efforts. Compulsory licensing can impede innovations due to the opportunistic behaviour of market participants but certain measures of state policy can prevent this negative effect.

Keywords: competition policy, compulsory licensing, process innovations

JEL Classification: L24, O31, K21

Suggested Citation

Shastitko, Andrey and Kurdin, Alexander, Incentives for Process Innovations Under Discrete Structural Alternatives of Competition Policy (April 14, 2015). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 92/EC/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2594664

Andrey Shastitko

Lomonossov Moscow State University ( email )

1-46 Leninskiye Gory
Moscow, 119991
Russia

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Moscow Campus ( email )

Moscow
Russia

Alexander Kurdin (Contact Author)

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Moscow Campus ( email )

Moscow
Russia

Moscow State University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

1-46 Leninskiye Gory
Moscow, 119991
Russia

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

20 Myasnitskaya str.
Moscow, 101000
Russia

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